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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
 
Summary 
 
  The Court considered an appeal from the district court’s grant of relief of an untimely 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a conviction based on a guilty plea.   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Court concluded that the State is required to disclose material exculpatory evidence 
to the defendant before a guilty plea. However, for the defendant to successfully challenge the 
validity of a guilty plea, three components must be demonstrated. In this case, the defendant did 
not meet the third component because he failed to establish that the evidence was material. 
Accordingly, the Court reversed the relief granted. 
   
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 A neighbor called the police after seeing the defendant, Charles Huebler,  acting 
inappropriately with children in his apartment complex’s pool. During the police investigation, a 
seven-year-old girl stated that Huebler inappropriately touched her on multiple occasions while 
they were swimming. The police retrieved surveillance tapes which showed Huebler and the girl 
in the pool together. 
  
 Following Huebler’s arrest, defense counsel filed a motion for discovery and asked for 
access to the surveillance tapes. The prosecutor had not yet received a copy of the tapes from the 
police, but the prosecutor told the defense counsel that the tapes would be sent to the public 
defender’s office when the district attorney’s office received them. Shortly thereafter, Huebler 
pled guilty to lewdness with a child under the age of 14. 
 
 Two years after the conviction, Huebler filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that 
alleged, among other things, that the State had violated Brady v. Maryland
2
 by not releasing the 
surveillance tapes and that, but for the State’s failure to disclose the evidence, he would have 
refused to plead guilty and proceeded to trial. The district court granted Huebler relief and ruled 
that the tapes were exculpatory evidence. The State appealed and argued that the district court 
did not use the appropriate materiality standard in deciding Huebler’s Brady claim was sufficient 
to demonstrate good cause for his delay and to warrant the relief granted. 
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 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
Discussion 
 
 Justice Douglas wrote for the Court, seated en banc.
3
  Because Huebler did not pursue a 
direct appeal, the Court first assessed whether Huebler had good cause for delay in filing the 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
4
 To show good cause, the petitioner must demonstrate that 
the delay was not the fault of the petitioner and that the petitioner would be unduly prejudiced if 
the petition were not granted.
5
  
 
The Court then determined that Huebler’s good cause claim was dependent on his Brady 
claim. To prove a Brady violation, the accused must show: (1) that the evidence was favorable to 
the accused, either because it was exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that the State withheld the 
evidence; and (3) that the withholding resulted in prejudice (“i.e., the evidence was material”).6 
Because the second and third components listed are interwoven with the criteria for 
demonstrating good cause, the Court reasoned that Huebler must satisfy the Brady claim to 
overcome the procedural time limit in Nevada. The Court reviewed the district court’s decision 
on the Brady claim de novo because it required consideration of facts and legal issues. 
 
 Before a review of the Brady components, the Court addressed whether a defendant 
challenging the validity of a guilty plea could assert a Brady claim. The issue exists because 
Brady has been labeled a trial right and because a defendant pleading guilty waives the right to a 
fair trial. The parties agreed that a Brady claim was not defeated by a guilty plea. Additionally, 
the Ninth Circuit held that a loss of Brady rights after a guilty plea could tempt prosecutors to 
withhold exculpatory evidence.
7
 On the other hand, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution 
does not require the disclosure of impeachment evidence related to informants or witnesses 
before a plea agreement.
8
 Ultimately, the Court held that the difference between exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence distinguished this case from the Supreme Court precedent, and that a 
defendant may challenge the validity of a guilty plea based on the prosecution’s failure to 
disclose material exculpatory information before entry of the plea.  The Court stated, though, that 
the guilty plea context requires a showing that the withheld evidence be “material” to 
demonstrate prejudice for the purposes of a Brady violation. 
 
 Next, the Court adopted the materiality test set by the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez v. U.S.
9
 
Therefore, when a defendant makes a specific request, the “withheld evidence is material in the 
guilty plea context if there is a reasonable possibility but for the failure to disclose the evidence 
the defendant would have refused to plead and would have insisted on going to trial.” 
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 To determine the reasonable possibility described above, the Court looked particularly at 
the list of factors used by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in determining materiality for Brady 
Claims. The five factors are: 1) the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s case; 2) the 
persuasiveness of the withheld evidence; 3) the reasons the defendant pled guilty; 4) the benefits 
the defendant received for pleading; and 5) the substance of the plea conversation.
10
 In accepting 
these factors as relevant, the Court maintained that each case may have other relevant factors 
worth considering. 
 
 The Court then listed five factors that demonstrated the improbability of Huebler refusing 
to plead guilty if the surveillance tapes had been released. First, there was substantial evidence of 
his guilt. Second, the tapes did not record any events underwater, and thus did not refute the 
victim’s claims. Therefore, it was questionable whether the tapes were exculpatory at all. Third, 
that State presented evidence that Huebler had insisted on pleading guilty. Fourth, Huebler 
received a benefit from entry of the guilty plea, because the charges were reduced and the 
investigation ended as a result of the plea. Fifth, Huebler signed an agreement which indicated he 
entered into the guilty plea knowingly.  Based on these factors, the Court concluded that the pre-
plea disclosure of the surveillance tapes would not have caused Huebler to refuse to plead guilty 
and instead insist on going to trial. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The State is required to disclose material exculpatory evidence within its possession to 
the defense before the entry of a guilty plea.  When the State fails to make this required 
disclosure, the defendant may challenge the validity of the guilty plea on that basis. 
 To succeed in challenging the validity of the guilty plea on such a basis, the defendant 
must demonstrate the three components of a Brady violation in the context of a guilty plea: (1) 
that the evidence at issue was exculpatory, (2) that the state withheld the evidence, and (3) that 
the evidence was material. 
 To demonstrate that withheld exculpatory evidence was material, the defendant must 
show a reasonable probability or possibility (depending on whether there was a specific 
discovery request) that he would have refused to plead guilty and insisted on going to trial if the 
withheld evidence had been delivered before entry of the guilty plea. 
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